“Something is wrong here. War, disease, death, destruction, hunger, filth, poverty, torture, crime, corruption, and the Ice Capades. Something is definitely wrong. This is not good work. If this is the best God can do, I am not impressed. Results like these do not belong on the résumé of a Supreme Being. This is the kind of shit you’d expect from an office temp with a bad attitude. And just between you and me, in any decently-run universe, this guy would’ve been out on his all-powerful ass a long time ago.” – George Carlin
In one of his most popular routines, George Carlin, in his own unique delivery, perfectly summarized the problem of evil. All around us are moral and natural evils that directly contradict God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Because evil exists, either there is no God, or he is doing a poor job. This paper will detail some arguments against the existence of God and responses to those arguments, and explain why evil is convincing evidence against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God.
The problem of evil is very simply summarized: (1) God is omnipotent, (2) God is omniscient, (3) God is omnibenevolent, and (4) evil exists. The logical problem of evil claims that there is a logical contradiction between (1) – (3) and (4), and concludes that God’s existence is logically impossible. If God is omnipotent and could eliminate all evil, but does not, God must not be all-loving. If God is omniscient and knows about all evil, but does not eliminate it, God must not be all-powerful. If God is omnibenevolent and does not want his creations to suffer, but does not know how to eliminate suffering, God must not be all-knowledgeable. As Hume observed (1779), “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?” We can then conclude that (5) God is not all-loving, (6) God is not all-powerful, and (7) God is not all-knowledgeable. There is a logical inconsistency between (1) – (3) and (5) – (7), and they cannot both be true. Because evil proves that (5) – (7) are true, (1) – (3) cannot be true, that is, God must either be not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not omnibenevolent.
The logical problem of evil is most directly addressed by claiming that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. By admitting that God has a good reason for allowing evil, philosophers then claim that if God is omnipotent and could eliminate all evil, but does not, God must not be all-loving unless he has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. Similar modifications to atheists arguments do not lead to (5), (6), or (7), and there is therefore no contradiction between the existence of evil and the omnicompetence of God. Because providing a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil is typically a posteriori and not a priori, the logical problem of evil is usually dismissed in favor of the evidential problem of evil, which is an a posteriori argument.
The evidential problem of evil works on the same statements as before, that (1) God is omnipotent, (2) God is omniscient, (3) God is omnibenevolent, and (4) evil exists. The evidential problem of evil depends on evidence to make its claim: that given the evidence of (4), the existence of God is highly improbable. Hume, the great empiricist, observed, “But allowing [that] human happiness in this life exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing; for this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. (1779)” Hume goes on to say that although pain and misery in man may be compatible with God’s omnicompetence, “a mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes [omnicompetence] from the present mixed and confused phenomena [suffering].” Theists can claim that God’s omnicompetence and evil are compatible, but cannot sufficiently prove God’s omnicompetence, given the evidence. Man’s happiness is certainly evidence for God’s omnibenevolence, but evil seems to be evidence for the opposite. Given the evidence, God’s existence is highly improbable.
Theodicies are theists’ attempts to provide a morally sufficient reason for God allowing evil. Many theists have stepped up to provide theodicies, including Augustine, Irenaeus, Aquinas, Leibniz, Rea, Murray, and Ekstrom. The most common theodicy is Aquinas’ theodicy, in which he argues that evil is not a created “thing.” In the account of the creation found in Genesis, God creates all things and calls them good. But evil was not listed among the creations of God. Evil is simply the absence of good, which absence we create through our choices. God did not create evil, nor does he cause it. Man creates evil through our misuse of free will. Augustine went a step farther to argue that God most values freedom and is justified in allowing evil in order to permit freedom.
Another evil presented as an argument against the existence of God is his own hiddenness. God, if he exists, should love us like a perfect parent. In our times of suffering, he should bear us up. In times of weakness, he should be our strength. In times of ignorance, he should reveal to us pure wisdom. Instead, we are left alone with, at best, inconclusive evidence for his existence and ambiguous religious experiences. Most religions claim that one must accept and worship God in order to gain salvation. God’s hiddenness, however, seems to be a form of evil, in that God commands us to develop a relationship with him, yet he remains hidden. God should either reveal himself or not require worship. Again, I turn to George Carlin for a solution to God’s hiddenness: “First thing the next morning, I became a sun-worshipper. Several reasons. First of all, I can see the sun, okay? Unlike some other gods I could mention, I can actually see the sun. I’m big on that. If I can see something, I don’t know, it kind of helps the credibility along, you know?”
Dr. Michael Murray responds that God must remain hidden. If God were to reveal himself, he would pose a threat to our free will. Although some disagree, most people would do whatever God says if he were to reveal himself to them. There are some that still do whatever God says even though he is hidden, but the key difference between the two types of obedience is moral responsibility. By obeying God through faith, man is morally responsible for his actions. But if God reveals himself, man is no longer morally responsible – God’s presence is the reason for action, and thus relieves man of his moral responsibility. God, therefore, must remain hidden in order to allow man to either draw closer to God or separate himself from God. In either case, God must allow man his free will in making his own decisions without external impulse.
There seems to be an abundance of justifications for God’s allowance of evil. But all the theodicies depend on faith for their acceptance. Faith is required to believe that God allows evil in order to preserve our free will. Faith is required to accept God’s hiddenness and still strive to be nearer to him. Because theodicies depend on faith, I tend to reject them. Theodicies show a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil – so why should my reason be insufficient for accepting the theodicy? Can God not have a logical and reasonable justification for allowing evil? God gave us reasoning, so why must I put that reasoning aside to accept his existence? I don’t think I should have to. Reason does not solve the problem of evil, especially in the face of contrary evidence, and thus I believe that the problem of evil is a very real problem for theism. Like Hume, I am bound by skepticism while “it is [the theist’s] turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support [their] philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience.”
Sources:
Carlin, George. George Carlin on Religion. 1999. Retrieved from http://rense.com/general69/obj.htm
Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 1779.
Logical Problem of Evil. 2003. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/